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INADEQUATE PRODUCT WARNINGS
AND CAUSATIONt
Mark Geistfeld*
The market failure that provides an economic justification for
imposing tort liability on product sellers for design and manufactur-
ing defects also justifies tort liability for inadequate warnings. In
general, the liability standards proposed in the most recent draft of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability have the
potential to remedy this market failure, although this purpose is not
furthered by the Draft's requirement that plaintiffs prove that an
adequate warning would have prevented the injury. Unless courts
presume causation (as most currently do), sellers will not have
sufficient incentive to warn about unavoidable product risks. More-
over, there is no persuasive reason to curtail liability for inadequate
warnings by adopting a more stringent causation standard, because
juries can resolve competently the issues involved in a determination
of whether a warning is inadequate. The presumption of causation
therefore should be retained by the Restatement (Third).
INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the tort rules that hold product sellers liable
for inadequate product warnings have received little critical
analysis from scholars.' Liability rules that require sellers to
provide information about product risk seem acceptable to just
about everyone, including the most ardent critics of the tort
system.2 The liability rules also involve issues that fit comfort-
ably within established tort doctrine. Whether a product warn-
ing is adequate can be resolved by the risk-utility test. The
question of causation-whether an adequate warning would
t Copyright © 1996 Mark A. Geistfeld.
* Associate Professor, New York University School of Law. B.A. 1980, Lewis and
Clark College; M.A. 1981, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1989, Ph.D. 1990, Columbia
University. This research was supported by a generous grant from the Filomen
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1. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Prod-
ucts Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 269 (1990)
(arguing that "the failure to warn claim has all but escaped searching analysis").
2. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES 213 (1988) (proposing "the law of warning" that would make "reasonably full
disclosure of safety-related information ... a required part of fair dealing").
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have prevented the injury-seems inconsequential because
presumably the reasonable consumer reads and follows product
warnings. The warning doctrine would thus appear to be im-
mune from criticism.
Nevertheless, tort scholars recently have criticized the warning
doctrine. Most notably, the Reporters to the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability, Professors James A. Henderson, Jr.
and Aaron D. Twerski, have argued that courts and juries
routinely make mistakes when evaluating the adequacy of
product warnings.3 They claim that these mistakes stem from
the tendency of courts and juries to find that a warning is
inadequate because it did not disclose more information or place
enough emphasis on the risk that caused the plaintiffs injury,
even though proper application of the risk-utility test would lead
to a contrary conclusion.4 This overenforcement of the liability
standard provides an incentive to sellers to overwarn about
product risks, which undermines the effectiveness of product
warnings to the ultimate detriment of consumers.5
Henderson and Twerski do not think that the overenforcement
problem can be remedied by tightening the liability standard,
however, because, like other commentators, they believe that
properly evaluating the adequacy of product warnings involves
many "intractable" problems.? Consequently, they propose to
limit liability by changing the causation inquiry. At present, the
issue of causation does not limit liability significantly because
courts either explicitly or as a practical matter have adopted a
rebuttable presumption that an adequate warning would have
prevented the injury.7 Henderson and Twerski propose to replace
3. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 296-303.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 296.
6. See id. at 297. For other views that courts necessarily will do a poor job of
evaluating the adequacy of product warnings, see Michael S. Jacobs, Toward A
Process-Based Approach to Failure-to-Warn Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 121, 126 (1992)
(arguing that the "important limiting concepts upon which the doctrine relies so heavily
for its effective functioning are hollow constructs incapable of assuming useful shape");
Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 1193, 1283 (1994) (claiming that "there is no reason to believe courts can assess
the efficacy of warnings in a reliable manner"). See also George L. Priest, The Modern
Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects and Its Reform, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 1991, at 31, 41 (arguing that the liability standard for warning defects provides
"no principled grounds for denying recovery").
7. The presumption is often called a "heeding presumption" because it presumes
that the plaintiff would have heeded or followed a warning had the defendant given one.
"A great many jurisdictions have adopted the heeding presumption in failure-to-warn
cases." Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 719 (N.J. 1993); see also Thomas H. Lee,
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the presumption of causation with a "fact-intensive" inquiry
addressing whether the plaintiff would have avoided injury by
heeding an adequate warning.' In many cases, plaintiffs will not
be able to satisfy this evidentiary burden, so eliminating the
presumption of causation would curtail liability for inadequate
warnings.9
Henderson and Twerski's proposal to eliminate the presump-
tion of causation is significant, as the proposal's essential
features are codified in the most recent draft of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability." But whether we should
eliminate the presumption of causation is a point of some
contention. Some commentators have argued that the presump-
tion of causation should be retained;" others have claimed that
Note, A PurposefulApproach to Products Liability Warnings and Non-English-Speaking
Consumers, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1115 n.35 (1994) (stating that a majority of courts
presume that a plaintiff would have read a warning had it been provided).
Other jurisdictions rely on a subjective standard for establishing causation. See
Jacobs, supra note 6, at 162-63 (stating that almost all courts have adopted one or two
approaches to causation, one that presumes causation and one that relies upon a
subjective standard to prove causation). As this Article will show, the subjective
standard is tantamount to a presumption of causation if the plaintiff can satisfy the
standard merely by testifying that she would not have purchased the product had she
known about an unavoidable risk that was not adequately disclosed in the product warn-
ing. See infra Part III.B. Because the subjective standard can be satisfied with such
testimony, see Jacobs, supra note 6, at 162-63 & n.162, these jurisdictions as a practical
matter presume causation when the inadequate warning claim pertains to the disclosure
of unavoidable risks. For warning claims that involve disclosures regarding product use,
the subjective standard ordinarily functions like a presumption because the plaintiff
invariably testifies that she would have read and heeded the adequate warning, and the
defendant faces substantial risks in attacking the plaintiffs testimony. See id. at 162-63.
"In these jurisdictions, as in those adopting the pro-plaintiff presumption, most plaintiffs
have practically proven causation before their trial even begins." Id. at 163.
8. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 325-26.
9. See id. at 326 (arguing that a system such as this one would allow judges to
dispose of weak claims more easily).
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10 (Tentative Draft No.
2, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2] (stating that the causation standard for
products liability cases is the same as the causation standard used in other tort cases).
The Draft also states: "Notwithstanding the defective condition of the product in the
absence of adequate warnings, if it is determined that a particular user or consumer
would have decided to use or consume even if warned, the lack of warnings is not a legal
cause of that plaintiffs harm." Id. § 2 cmt. h. This outcome is consistent with the
presumption, however, as the defendant can rebut the presumption.
11. One view is that the presumption of causation is desirable because "to require
plaintiffs to prove that they would have followed clear warnings-to exculpate the
manufacturer here because it did not cause the accident-seems unwise; liability should
attach because it will encourage people to sue and thus police the adequacy of warnings."
Alan Schwartz, Causation in Private Tort Law: A Comment on Kelman, 63 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 639, 644 (1987); see also 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY-REPORTERS' STUDY 80 (1991) (arguing that the presumption of
WINTER AND SPRING 19971
312 University of Michigan Journal of Law Refonn [VOL. 30:2&3
the standard of causation, whatever its form, makes little
practical difference.12 Although these assessments are instruc-
tive, they are of limited usefulness because the role played by
the causation element depends, as Henderson and Twerski have
observed, on whether courts and juries tend to overenforce the
liability standard.l1 If, for example, courts and juries improperly
impose liability on sellers in the vast majority of cases, then it
might make sense to limit the scope of liability with a more
stringent causation inquiry. Thus, in order to decide whether the
presumption of causation should be eliminated, we must first
determine whether courts and juries can properly apply the
liability standard for warning defects in the Restatement (Third)
Draft.
Undertaking this analysis yields the conclusion that the
presumption of causation should be retained. To establish this
conclusion requires resolution of some basic issues: What is an
adequate warning? Why are adequate warnings not provided by
product sellers in unregulated market transactions? And if
unregulated markets are inefficient because product sellers fail
to provide adequate warnings, would the liability standards in
the Restatement (Third) Draft remedy this market failure? This
Article argues that the Draft proposes liability standards that
can correct this market failure. But, if the presumption of causa-
tion is eliminated, tort liability would not give product sellers
a sufficient incentive to provide adequate warnings.
Part I describes how product sellers in unregulated markets
can supply products that are insufficiently safe and warnings
that are insufficiently informative when consumers make
decisions on the basis of imperfect information. Part I then
causation should be retained because it "maximizes the number of occasions on which
firms that warn badly are called to account"). A different view is that eliminating the
presumption "would eviscerate warning law drastically." Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't
Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus on
Warning Law is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1125, 1152 (1994).
In contrast to these views, this Article shows that the impact of the presumption of
causation depends on the type of case. The presumption is necessary if tort liability is
to give sellers a sufficient incentive to disclose information pertaining to unavoidable
risks. The presumption is not necessary, however, in order for tort liability to give sellers
a sufficient incentive to disclose information pertaining to product use, although the
presumption promotes that objective as well. See infra Part III.
12. See Jacobs, supra note 6, at 160 (opining that "causation in warnings cases is
peculiarly and innately a simple matter for plaintiffs. No amount of judicial tinkering
can make it otherwise"). This conclusion is incorrect because the causation inquiry will
affect the plaintiffs ability to recover for certain types of cases. See infra Part III.
13. Cf supra note 7.
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explains how the liability standards in the Restatement (Third)
Draft can rectify this market failure. Tort liability for design
defects gives manufacturers an incentive to provide products
with the cost-effective amount of safety. This liability standard
ordinarily does not address the question of whether the total
utility of the product exceeds the risk it creates, leaving this
aspect of product choice to the consumer. Imperfectly informed
consumers therefore need the risk-related information that
would enable them to decide which products are most appropri-
ate for them and how they should use those products. Tort
liability for inadequate warnings gives product sellers an
incentive to provide such information.
Part II addresses the question of whether courts and juries
can competently evaluate the adequacy of product warnings. It
begins by analyzing the characteristics of an adequate warning
and then uses these characteristics to derive a set of jury
instructions that implement the requirements of the liability
standard in the Restatement (Third) Draft. The proposed jury
instructions require resolution of issues that are not particularly
problematic, indicating that warning cases do not raise a unique
set of concerns calling for special rules to limit liability.
As there is no special need to curtail any overenforcement of
the liability standard, the various ways to establish causation
can each be evaluated on their merits. Accordingly, Part III
analyzes how different methods of establishing causation affect
the ability of plaintiffs to recover for inadequate warnings. The
analysis shows that if the plaintiff must rely on credible evi-
dence to prove that an adequate warning would have prevented
the injury, then product users will rarely establish causation for
cases involving the nondisclosure or ineffective disclosure of
"unavoidable risks"-those risks that remain in products that
are designed, manufactured, and used properly. Any approach
to causation that depends upon proof other than the plaintiffs
self-serving testimony therefore will lead to an insufficient
amount of tort liability and an insufficient amount of disclosure.
Hence, if the purpose of this form of tort liability is to give
sellers an incentive to disclose the efficient amount of risk-
related information, the presumption of causation should be
retained.
WINTER AND SPRING 19971
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I. THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF TORT LIABILITY
FOR INADEQUATE WARNINGS
A fundamental premise of economics is that in making deci-
sions about products, consumers seek to maximize their
well-being or utility. Consumers maximize their utility by
purchasing products that provide the greatest net benefit-the
difference between the various benefits and costs of the prod-
uct.'4 Consumers, however, are not always certain of a product's
net benefit; instead, they often must estimate the benefits and
costs of the product on the basis of limited information. As a
result, imperfectly informed consumers purchase products they
expect will give them the greatest net benefit, so sellers often
supply products that conform to these expectations even when
they know that consumers are mistaken in their expectations.
Of course, a seller might let consumers know about the mistake,
but that is unlikely if the seller profits from the mistake. In
these market settings, then, imperfectly informed consumers
frequently make choices that do not maximize their well-being.
The circumstances that create such inefficient outcomes
-market failures-may justify regulating market transactions
with tort rules. In particular, when consumers underestimate
or are otherwise unaware of product risks, manufacturers in
unregulated markets supply insufficiently safe products. The
market failure caused by this form of imperfect information
provides an economic justification for holding manufacturers
liable in tort for injuries caused by products that have been
designed or manufactured defectively. Similarly, product sellers
in unregulated markets disclose an insufficient amount of risk-
related information when consumers underestimate or are
otherwise unaware of product risks. Thus, the same market
failure that justifies tort liability for design and manufacturing
defects also provides the economic rationale for making product
sellers liable for inadequate product warnings. The Restatement
(Third) Draft reflects this rationale for tort liability, as it
promulgates liability standards that have the potential to give
product sellers an incentive to provide optimally safe products
accompanied by adequate warnings.
14. Net benefit is the utility a consumer derives from a product less the costs (or
disutility) the product imposes on the consumer. Hence, to maximize utility the
consumer must maximize the net benefit she derives from every product she purchases.
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A. Market Failure in Sellers' Provision of Product
Safety and Information About Product Risk
Consumer knowledge of product risk is perhaps the most
important factor that determines the amount of product safety
sellers provide in unregulated markets. To understand why,
assume a one in one hundred risk that a product will cause a
consumer to suffer one thousand dollars in damages. The
expected value (average cost) of this risk is ten dollars, so it
would be cost-effective for the manufacturer to spend five dollars
per product on a safety feature that eliminates the risk. Never-
theless, manufacturers that are not liable for the injury may
profit by selling the product without this safety feature. Omit-
ting the safety feature lowers production costs by five dollars per
product, enabling the manufacturer to sell the product at a
lower price. Consumers who do not fully appreciate the risk
posed by the less safe product may decide to buy it because of
the lower price. Although the omitted safety feature decreases
the net benefit of the product to consumers (as the five dollar
reduction in price is less than the ten dollar increase in the
consumer's expected injury costs), consumers who underestimate
the risk of injury might mistakenly conclude otherwise. A con-
sumer who is unaware of the risk, for example, attaches no
benefit to the safety feature and therefore would be unwilling
to pay an additional five dollars for a product that has this
feature. Hence, consumers who are unaware of product risks or
otherwise underestimate them will purchase insufficiently safe
products, creating a market failure that may justify tort
liability. 15
Consumer knowledge of product risk also affects the amount
of risk-related information that sellers will disclose in unregu-
lated markets. A consumer's belief about the risk of injury
stemming from product use can affect her estimate of the bene-
fits or costs of the product. Consequently, imperfectly informed
consumers might overestimate the net benefit of the product,
thereby increasing consumer demand over the amount that
15. Tort liability is not necessarily efficient, because it creates costs that may exceed
its benefits. See generally Mark Geistfeld, Manufacturer Moral Hazard and the
Tort-Contract Issue in Products Liability, 15 INTL REV. LAW & ECON. 241, 241 (1995)
(defining the different types of imperfect information that render contracting inefficient
and may create an efficiency-enhancing role for tort liability).
WINTER AND SPRING 19971
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would occur if consumers were well informed of product risks.
Because sellers profit from these mistakes, they are unlikely to
give consumers the risk-related information that would enable
them to estimate more accurately the net benefits of the
product.
Consider how a consumer's knowledge of risk affects her
assessment of product benefits. Any benefit the consumer would
get from certain kinds of use will be outweighed by the risk of
injury created by such use. A consumer who is aware of the risk
would not plan to use the product in this manner and would not
attach any benefit to such product use. Consumers who do not
fully appreciate the risk, however, may plan to use the product
in this way. These consumers therefore expect to get a benefit
from an undesirable product use, and this benefit might provide
the decisive reason why the consumer decides to purchase the
product. Consequently, sellers have an incentive not to disclose
the risk.
For example, an apartment dweller who enjoys barbecued
foods may want to purchase an outdoor gas grill even though
she cannot use the grill outdoors. There are obvious inconve-
niences created by barbecuing indoors (smoke), but it is plau-
sible that some individuals would like to buy the grill despite
these inconveniences. It is less obvious, however, that if the grill
leaks gas in a confined area (an apartment), there is a signifi-
cant risk of explosion. Apartment dwellers who know about the
risk of explosion would decide not to buy the grill, but those who
are unaware of this risk may purchase the product. Of course,
the seller could tell consumers that the grill should not be used
indoors because of the risk of explosion. This disclosure would
have a negative impact on sales and profits, however, so sellers
in an unregulated market have an incentive not to disclose
information about the risks of using the grill indoors.
Risk-related information can also affect the consumer's esti-
mate of product costs. Any cost that consumers know they will
incur by using the product reduces their estimate of the net
benefit they expect to derive from the product. Risk-related
disclosures that cause consumers to increase their estimate of
the cost of using the product therefore would reduce consumer
demand, giving sellers an incentive not to make such disclo-
sures. Two types of disclosures fall into this category.
The first type pertains to disclosures regarding precautions
that consumers should take when using the product. Consumers
benefit from precautions that enable them to reduce the risk of
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product-caused injury in a cost-effective manner. Consumers
who are not aware of the risk will not be aware of the need to
take a precaution, however. Other consumers who are aware of
the risk may not know that it can be reduced by certain precau-
tions. Many consumers therefore would prefer to know about
such precautions, but if using the product in a safe manner is
costly for the consumer, the product seller may choose not to
disclose this information. By making consumers aware of the
desirable but costly precaution, the information reduces con-
sumer demand by reducing consumer estimates of the net
benefit they would derive from the product. Sellers therefore
have an incentive to withhold information about the need for
consumers to take costly safety precautions that reduce the risk
of product-caused injury.'"
Product sellers may also have an incentive not to disclose
information about "unavoidable" product risks. Often, products
that are designed, manufactured, and used properly still present
a risk of injury to the consumer. Drugs, for example, can pro-
duce side effects for users. 7 Similarly, many products contain
chemicals (such as carcinogens) that are hazardous to human
health. If the seller is not liable for the injuries (such as cancer)
that inevitably occur to some people who use these products,
consumers need to account for the costs they will incur if
injured.' For example, suppose there is an unavoidable one in
16. This concept is illustrated by a study involving a warning that informed users
of a caustic drain opener about the need to wear rubber gloves in order to reduce by an
average of .000061 the risk of hand burns severe enough to require medical treatment.
The study is described in W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Proper Role for Hazard Warnings
in Products Liability Cases, 13 J. PROD. LiAB. 139, 153-56 (1991). It is plausible that
most consumers know that caustic chemicals can be hard on the hands. It is also
plausible that few people realize there is a small chance of suffering severe hand burns
that require medical treatment. The study indicated that disclosure of this information
would enhance consumer welfare because, once informed of the risk, 82% of the individu-
als studied said they would wear rubber gloves to reduce the risk of serious burn, even
though the disutility, or cost, to users of wearing the gloves was $.17 per bottle. Even
though it would be desirable for the seller to disclose this information in a warning,
there are strong reasons for believing that the seller would not do so willingly. The
disclosure would increase a consumer's estimate of the cost of the product by up to $.17
per bottle, and thus reduce by up to $.17 the consumer's estimate of the product's net
benefit. Hence, it is likely that consumer demand would be lower after disclosure. The
decrease in demand is likely to decrease profits, which is why the seller has an incentive
not to disclose. (If consumer demand were not affected significantly by the increased cost,
the seller would find it more profitable to raise the price of the product by up to $.17
per bottle rather than to make the disclosure.)
17. For example, it is estimated that for every 2000 women taking birth control pills
each year, one woman suffers blood clotting requiring hospitalization. See MacDonald
v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 67 n.4 (Mass. 1985).
18. Although consumers often have other sources of insurance to compensate for
the injury, first-party insurance rarely provides full compensation for the injury in
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one hundred risk that the product will cause the consumer to
suffer one thousand dollars in damages. At the time of purchase,
the risk of injury imposes a cost on each consumer at least equal
to ten dollars per product (the expected value of the risk), so
consumers should factor this ten dollar cost into their estimate
of the product's net benefit. Consumers who are unaware of the
risk will not account for this cost, however, thereby inflating
their estimate of the product's net benefit by ten dollars. Conse-
quently, these consumers will buy more of the product than they
would if they knew about the unavoidable risk. By disclosing
information about the unavoidable product risk, sellers would
reduce sales and profits, so they have an incentive not to make
the disclosure.
As a general matter, then, product sellers have an incentive
not to disclose risk-related information that would reduce
consumer estimates of the product's net benefit. But why do
consumers not acquire this information on their own? The
reason is simple: If information were free, everyone would be
perfectly informed about everything, making questions of
disclosure irrelevant. Information about product risks, however,
is often costly to obtain.' 9 Moreover, given the low level of risk
posed by most products and the widespread lack of consumer
knowledge about the risk, any given individual often will find
the benefits of acquiring the information about any one product
are not worth the costs. Thus, unless product sellers disclose
risk-related information, consumers are not likely to have such
information available to them when they make decisions about
the purchase and use of products.2 °
question. Deductibles and co-insurance provisions commonly result in the insured
bearing from 20% to 40% of pecuniary losses under first-party insurance. See George
L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability be Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 237,
242 (1992). Also, little, if any, first-party insurance coverage is available for pain and
suffering. See id. at 245.
19. For example, the cost of gaining Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval
for pharmaceutical products (which involves determinations regarding the benefits and
risks of drugs) has been estimated to be more than $230 million in 1990. See Paul
Abrahams, A Tricky Balancing Act for Regulators, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 15, 1991,
§ 1, at 19 (quoting a spokesperson of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of
America).
20. The issue of why consumer demand does not force product sellers to provide
risk-related information remains. If consumers purchased only those products that
contained warnings, sellers would have an incentive to supply a warning. But if
imperfectly informed consumers cannot verify the veracity of these warnings, they would
not find the warnings to be credible. For example, if a seller provided a warning that
the product poses one small risk, then a consumer who knows that sellers benefit by
not fully disclosing would believe this warning only if the seller guaranteed that the
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B. The Role of Tort Liability
When consumers underestimate or are unaware of product
risks, unregulated market transactions will yield insufficiently
safe products. To remedy this market failure, sellers must have
a reason not to sell such products. The Restatement (Third)
Draft creates such an incentive by making commercial sellers
and distributors liable for injuries caused by defectively designed
products.2 To understand the incentives created by this liability
standard, consider its impact on a manufacturer that currently
has a defectively designed product. According to the Restatement
(Third) Draft, a product is defectively designed if the cost of a
safer design is less than the safety benefit (reduced injury costs)
achieved by that design.22 Thus, the increased cost the manufac-
turer would incur by adopting a nondefective design is necessari-
ly less than the savings in liability (injury) costs that the
manufacturer would experience were it to adopt the safer
design.23 The manufacturer therefore can minimize total costs,
which is necessary if profits are to be maximized, by adopting
a nondefective design.
warning adequately describes all the risks actually posed by the product. There is no
way to determine whether the seller fulfilled this guarantee, however, without litigating
the issue of whether the warning is adequate. Cf Geistfeld, supra note 15, at 249-51
(describing how contractual guarantees of product quality operate like a tort rule of
negligence).
21. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 10, § 1.
22. The Restatement (Third) Draft states that"a product is defective in design when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided
by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . ." Id. § 2. According to the
Reporters, "whether a proferred design is a reasonable alternative can be determined
only after a comparison of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the competing
designs, utilizing the various factors for risk-utility balancing. .. ." Id. reporters' note
cmt. e, at 99-100. In effect, then, a cost-benefit test determines whether a design is
defective. See also id. § 2 cmt. a, at 15 (explaining that the design-defect liability
emphasis "is on creating incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety
in designing and marketing products").
23. Strictly speaking, this statement is necessarily true only for the nondefective
design that can be attained at the lowest cost for the manufacturer. Once the product
design is nondefective, the manufacturer no longer is liable for injuries caused by the
design. Hence, further safety improvements will increase the cost of production by more
than the (nonexistent) decrease in the manufacturer's liability costs, so the liability
standard will not induce the manufacturer to make these additional safety improvements
even though the resulting designs would also be nondefective.
In addition, design-defect liability will not lead to optimally safe products if courts
and juries do not enforce the standard properly or if victims do not always pursue
meritorious tort claims.
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Tort liability for design defects, however, is not sufficient to
remedy the market failure that occurs when consumers un-
derestimate or are unaware of product risks. Consumers often
must exercise care while using a properly designed product, so
something other than design-defect liability is needed to give
product sellers an incentive to provide information about product
use. In addition, the liability standard for design defects ordi-
narily does not address the question of whether the utility of the
product outweighs its risk.24 As a result, even though the design-
defect standard helps to ensure that the design of a product
(such as a prescription drug) is sufficiently safe, consumers still
must decide whether the utility of the product exceeds its costs,
including those caused by unavoidable risks. (Do the health
benefits of the drug outweigh its costs, including the risk of
suffering side-effects?) As we have found, consumers who
underestimate or who are unaware of product risks will tend to
err by choosing overly risky products. Consequently, if consum-
ers are to make the right decisions regarding product safety, tort
liability must give product sellers a sufficient incentive to
disclose risk-related information.25
The Restatement (Third) Draft may create such an incentive
by making product sellers liable for injuries caused by
24. To establish a design defect, the plaintiff typically must show that there is a
reasonable alternative design that would reduce the risk. See Tentative Draft No. 2,
supra note 10, § 2 cmt. c, at 19-21. This requirement means that the plaintiff normally
cannot establish a design defect by showing that the overall utility of the product is
outweighed by its risks because such a showing is based upon "no alternative" as
opposed to a reasonable alternative design. To be sure, "the designs of some products
are so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have low social utility and high degree of
danger, that liability should attach even absent proofofa reasonable alternative design."
Id. § 2 cmt. d. The circumstances in which courts are willing to impose liability on this
basis are, however, rare. See id. § 2 reporters' note cmt. d (noting that "a number of
courts have suggested [imposing such liability] in rare instances"). For most products,
then, the liability standard for design defects does not include consideration of whether
the total utility of the product exceeds the risk it creates.
25. In contrast to the risks inherent in product design and use, disclosures
regarding the risks inherent in the manufacturing process (due to manufacturing
defects) may not be necessary. Commercial sellers are strictly liable for injuries caused
by manufacturing defects. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 10, § 2(a). The expected
injury cost of manufacturing defects therefore may be contained already in the price of
the product. If so, consumers need not estimate this injury cost in deriving their
estimate of the product's net benefit, so a disclosure is not needed. But to the extent that
consumers bear some injury costs when injured by manufacturing defects (attorney fees,
for example, often leave consumers with less than full compensation), then consumers
might need to be warned about manufacturing defects in order to estimate accurately
the product's net benefit.
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inadequate product warnings.2" Suppose a disclosure would
reduce the average consumer's estimate of the net benefit of the
product by ten dollars. Although sellers in unregulated markets
have an incentive not to make this disclosure, the threat of tort
liability can give the seller an incentive to disclose. For example,
if a seller's liability costs for nondisclosure would increase the
product price by eleven dollars, the average consumer's estimate
of the product's net benefit would decrease by that amount, an
amount that exceeds the cost of disclosure. Under these circum-
stances, the seller is better off by disclosing the risk-related
information and avoiding the liability costs (and concomitant
price increase). Consequently, tort liability for inadequate prod-
uct warnings might give sellers a sufficient incentive to disclose
risk-related information because of the impact of liability costs
on product price.
II. DETERMINING THE ADEQUACY OF WARNINGS
A seller can avoid tort liability by providing a warning that
is "adequate" according to the liability standard in the Restate-
ment (Third) Draft. But what constitutes an "adequate" warning
as a matter of tort law will not be adequate for consumers if
courts and juries improperly apply the liability standard and
give sellers an incentive to provide product warnings that do not
best promote consumer welfare. Thus, even though tort liability
for inadequate warnings can give sellers an incentive to provide
warnings that consumers prefer, whether tort liability attains
this objective depends on how courts and juries apply the
liability standard.
To determine whether tort liability is likely to lead to the
provision of warnings preferred by consumers, we must first
understand the characteristics of such a warning. These charac-
teristics can then be used to derive the set of questions that
juries must resolve when evaluating the adequacy of a warning.
An examination of these issues indicates that a jury is well
suited to evaluate the adequacy of a warning. Consequently,
courts and juries should be able to apply the liability standard
so that sellers have an incentive to provide warnings that
maximize consumer welfare.
26. See id. § 2(c) (imposing liability if "reasonable instructions or warnings" could
have lessened the "forseeable risks" associated with a product).
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A. Conceptualizing an Adequate Warning
Although consumers try to maximize the net benefit they
expect to derive from products, the cost of acquiring information
often forces them to make these decisions on the basis of imper-
fect information. Product warnings enhance consumer welfare
by enabling consumers to avoid mistakes caused by imperfect
information. Hence an adequate product warning-that is, a
warning which best promotes consumer welfare-is one that
enables consumers to make the best estimate of the product's
net benefit.
Whether a warning is adequate cannot be determined without
reference to its cost. The cost an individual faces in order to
acquire information creates the need for disclosure in the first
instance (because if information were free, then presumably
everyone would be perfectly informed and would know the risks
without having a warning). Although this cost is reduced by
product warnings, it does not disappear. Every consumer incurs
a cost (in the form of time and attention) by reading and remem-
bering the various disclosures in a warning.27 If we ignore this
information cost, we will undermine the efficacy of product
warnings for most individuals. According to two of the leading
experts in risk assessment, "A major practical problem is
ensuring that individuals read the warning label or acquire
information in some other form, since there is no general
assurance that individuals will do so."2" Individuals will stop
reading a warning if they find that the benefit of reading is not
worth the effort.2" Indeed, product users might ignore warnings
altogether if they find that warnings in general are not worth
reading. A warning will promote informed consumer deci-
sionmaking, then, only if the cost consumers incur to acquire the
information from the warning does not exceed the benefit
consumers derive from their more well-informed product choices.
27. See, e.g., WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP Viscusi, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES
TO REGULATION 87-105 (1992) (describing a study finding that a cost is created by any
new item of information on a product warning, due to the effect that additional
information has on the consumer's ability to recall other information contained in the
warning).
28. Id. at 8. For a discussion of the various reasons product users may not digest
all the risk-related information in a warning, see Latin, supra note 6, at 1206-48.
29. See Latin, supra note 6, at 1210-12 (arguing that consumers may not consider
it worthwhile to read warnings if they can rely on their own knowledge and/or if the
warning creates an "information overload").
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Due to the information cost created by disclosures, the efficacy
of a warning necessarily depends upon how well it performs on
average. Consumers vary widely in terms of their knowledge,
background, physical characteristics, and other traits that
determine the kind of information an individual wants in a
product warning. A warning cannot be tailored to satisfy each
individual's needs, however, because the same warning is given
to all product users. For example, even if a warning specified all
information that could conceivably be relevant to some individu-
al, the length of such a warning would render it unsatisfactory
for most individuals. Hence, due to the information cost that
warnings create for each consumer, any given warning is
unlikely to satisfy the needs of every product user. Instead, at
best a warning can maximize informed decisionmaking for
consumers as a group. An adequate warning therefore performs
better on average than alternative (and inadequate) warnings,
even though any given alternative might be beneficial for some
individuals; that is, an adequate warning satisfies the needs of
the average consumer.3 °
The average consumer wants the warning to contain any
disclosures that would significantly affect her decisions about
product purchases or use. Consequently, an adequate warning
need not disclose a risk that is easily observed and comprehend-
ed by the average consumer, as a disclosure about this risk does
not affect the average consumer's decisionmaking and accord-
ingly is immaterial.3 Indeed, if the disclosure is not material for
the average consumer, the warning should not contain it. A
nonmaterial disclosure for the average consumer necessarily
creates costs for all consumers that exceed the benefit some
consumers might derive from the disclosure.32 A warning that
30. Under certain conditions, the preferences of a fictional "representative consum-
er" can be used as a measure of social welfare, so that maximization of this consumer's
utility would result in the maximization of social welfare. See ANDREU MAS-COLEL ET
AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 116-22 (1995).
31. Merely because consumers are aware of a risk does not imply that there should
be no disclosure. Consumers can underestimate the risk, leading to the market failure
described in Part I, so there is a potential benefit that may make such disclosure
desirable. The relevant question, then, is whether consumers are sufficiently well
informed of the risk's nature.
32. The cost of reading and comprehending a nonmaterial disclosure is some
positive amount for the average consumer, so it necessarily exceeds the nonexistent
benefit that the nonmaterial disclosure provides to the average consumer. Because such
a disclosure actually makes the average consumer worse off, and the average consumer
merely reflects an averaging of the total costs and total benefits for the group, it follows
that the total costs of the disclosure for the group exceed the benefit some consumers
might derive from the disclosure.
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maximizes consumer welfare therefore contains only those
disclosures of risk-related information material to the average
consumer.
As this discussion suggests, whether any given disclosure is
"material" depends upon how much risk-related information is
otherwise available to the average consumer. By definition, the
average consumer has the average amount of information. To
understand what this means, consider a case in which 50% of
all consumers fully understand a risk and the remaining 50%
do not adequately comprehend the risk. A consumer with the
average amount of information can be thought of as someone
who knows there is a 50% chance that he fully understands the
risk and a 50% chance that he does not.33 The average consumer
would want the warning to disclose the risk if the 50% chance
of benefitting from the disclosure exceeds the cost of reading the
disclosure. Materiality therefore depends upon the chance that
an individual will benefit from disclosure (that is, the proportion
of uninformed consumers in the group) and the amount of
benefit an uninformed individual derives from the disclosure.
Two implications follow from this conclusion.
First, an adequate warning does not contain information about
insignificant risks, because the insignificant benefit created by
the disclosure is outweighed by the cost consumers incur in
order to digest the disclosure. Second, if a large enough propor-
tion of consumers are aware of the risk, an adequate warning
need not disclose it. Suppose that 99% of consumers fully
understand the risk. In determining whether disclosure is
desirable, the average consumer compares the 1% chance of
benefitting from disclosure to the cost of reading the disclosure.
For many risks the slight benefit will not be worth the cost.
Moreover, the consumer can easily find out about the risk from
other sources given the widespread knowledge of the risk in the
community. It would be cheaper for uninformed individuals to
learn about the risk from these other sources than it would be
to force 99% of all consumers to read a disclosure that is
33. A person with these odds expects to have information available to him equal
to the average amount of information among all consumers. Formulating the problem
in this manner is consistent with the assumption that consumers are not perfectly
informed of risk, because even those consumers who have some knowledge of risk often
do not know whether they are sufficiently well informed. That knowledge can be
obtained only from an adequate warning, which in effect enables the consumer to
compare his knowledge with the manufacturer's knowledge of product risk.
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superfluous for them.34 A risk that is commonly understood in
the community therefore need not be disclosed in an adequate
warning because the disclosure offers a minor benefit to the
average individual, and there are less costly ways for unin-
formed individuals to acquire the information.
Whether a warning is adequate also depends upon the method
of disclosure, because the form of communication affects the
likelihood that consumers will benefit from the information. The
disclosure must be written in a manner that is commonly
understood.35 The warning also should not be overly long, as
such warnings impose unnecessary costs on consumers and
therefore make it less likely that product users will read the
entire warning.36
The design of the warning also affects the likelihood that the
warning will improve consumer decisionmaking. Consider a
poorly designed warning that has no apparent organization and
tends to place the least significant risks at the beginning.
Because product users cannot discern the organization of the
information, they are likely to start reading the warning from
the beginning. As the risks described initially are the least
34. See Carol Rogerson & Michael Trebilcock, Products Liability and the Allergic
Consumer: A Study in the Problems of Framing an Efficient Liability Regime, 36 U.
TORONTO L.J. 52, 89-94 (1986).
35. Suppose the average consumer has a 50% chance of understanding a disclosure
and a 50% chance of not understanding it. Suppose the disclosure could be rewritten
so that 90% of all consumers would understand it. The average consumer would prefer
that the disclosure be rewritten in this manner if the 40% chance of benefitting from
the rewritten disclosure exceeds an additional cost created by the rewritten disclosure.
If, for example, the disclosure can be rewritten without significantly increasing the
average consumer's cost of digesting the information, then the average consumer would
prefer that the disclosure be rewritten. Disclosures rewritten in foreign languages may
be of this type, assuming that someone who understands English does not need to read
warnings written in other languages. But if the disclosure can only be rewritten in a
manner that increases the average consumer's cost of digesting the information, then
we also need to consider whether there are cheaper ways for the consumer to understand
the warning. For cases in which a large proportion of consumers understand a warning
as written, it is also likely to be true that someone who does not understand the warning
could easily get that information from other sources. See id. at 91. Warnings that are
commonly understood therefore need not be rewritten because the average consumer
derives little benefit from a different formulation and uninformed consumers can rely
on relatively less costly sources in order to understand the warning.
36. The possibility that too much disclosure may undermine informed
decisionmaking has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, albeit in a context
different from the one discussed here. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976) (ruling that a disclosure standard which might bring an
overabundance of information within the reach of shareholders is not desirable, since
it could lead management "simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial
information-a result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking").
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significant, most product users might decide that reading the
entire warning is not worth the effort.3 7 This outcome harms the
average consumer-and the warning therefore is inade-
quate-because product users may not get to the disclosures
regarding the most significant risks. A better format would give
more significant risks greater emphasis, making it more likely
that product users will pay attention to the most significant
risks. An adequately designed warning therefore emphasizes
risks in proportion to their significance. 8
Thus, the characteristics of an adequate warning reflect the
conditions that create the need for disclosure. In the same way
that the cost of acquiring information prevents consumers from
being well informed about product risks, this cost can also
prevent consumers from digesting all the information contained
in a product warning. Too much information might harm
consumers by reducing the likelihood that consumers will read
and consider the warning. To ensure that more information will
lead to better decisionmaking, an adequate warning maximizes
the likelihood that consumers will read the warning by mini-
mizing the cost that consumers incur to acquire the information.
An adequate warning achieves this objective by conveying
concisely only that information which would be material to the
average consumer in a manner that can be understood common-
ly and in a format that emphasizes risks according to their
significance.
37. "Sequencing inevitably denotes relative importance and will have an impact on
the weight a consumer attaches to the risk." Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 308
(citations omitted).
38. According to Wesley Magat and Kip Viscusi:
The efficacy of the approach [to disclosure] will depend in large part upon its
prominence. Thus a hazard warning that is not in a prominent location on a
product, or that ranks low in terms of the overall priority of the messages conveyed
by the product label, is much less likely to be read than a warning that ranks high
in this priority.
MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 27, at 8.
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B. The Liability Standard for Inadequate Warnings
in the Restatement (Third) Draft
The liability standard for inadequate product warnings in the
Restatement (Third) Draft reflects the principles that define an
"adequate" warning from the consumer's perspective. The
standard for evaluating a warning is based on the risk-utility
test.39 To recover, the plaintiff must show that the seller did not
provide a specific warning or instruction that satisfies this test.
In evaluating the "risk," or cost, of the plaintiffs requested
disclosure, the finder of fact must consider that warnings which
are "too numerous or detailed may be ignored [by consumers]
and [are] thus ineffective .... [Potentially useful instructions
and warnings can be debased if attention must also be directed
to trivial or far-fetched risks."4" The cost of disclosure must then
be compared to the utility or benefit the additional information
creates by enabling consumers to make better decisions about
product safety.4' By showing that the extant warning does not
contain a disclosure that satisfies the risk-utility test, the
plaintiff in effect shows that the warning is inadequate because
it does not make a disclosure with a cost less than its benefit.
Consequently, the risk-utility test requires the type of disclo-
sures that maximize consumer welfare.42
The risk-utility test can also resolve the issue of whether the
manufacturer has designed the warning properly. A poorly de-
signed warning does not emphasize risks in proportion to their
significance. A new design alters the emphasis given to risk
disclosures in the warning, creating a benefit from the greater
emphasis of some risks and a cost due to the reduced emphasis
of other risks. Thus, an alternative design that properly empha-
sizes risks in terms of their significance will pass the risk-utility
test, because greater emphasis of more significant risks
39. The test for judging the adequacy of warnings "parallels" the standard for
evaluating the safety of product designs. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 10, § 2 cmt.
h. Hence, the risk-utility test provides the standard of inadequate warnings. See id. § 1
(describing the liability standard for design defects).
40. Id. § 2 cmt. h.
41. See id.
42. This conclusion assumes that the risk-utility test is defined by reference to the
needs of the average consumer. Cf supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. Courts
typically require that the product warning should be directed to the attention of the
average user or consumer. See Jacobs, supra note 6, at 127 & n.21.
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necessarily creates a benefit that exceeds the cost stemming
from the reduced emphasis of less significant risks. Designs that
satisfy the risk-utility test therefore maximize consumer welfare.
Even though the risk-utility test promotes consumer welfare,
some argue that the test is inappropriate because courts do not
find the information cost of warnings to be relevant.43 To be
sure, some courts have claimed that the information cost created
by warnings is not a significant consideration that should limit
liability.' This claim, however, is inconsistent with the underly-
ing premise of tort liability in this area: that information costs
prevent consumers from being well informed of product risks.
Moreover, courts commonly recognize that an adequate warning
should be directed to the average consumer;45 that an adequate
warning need not disclose commonly known or insignificant
risks;46 and that a warning can be inadequate because of its
design.47 These aspects of an adequate warning stem from the
need to minimize the cost consumers must incur in order to
digest the information contained in a warning,4" so there is
ample precedent for a liability standard such as the risk-utility
test that relies upon information costs to determine the adequa-
cy of a product warning.
A more fundamental problem with the risk-utility test is
highlighted by the Restatement (Third) Draft, which raises
questions about the ability of courts and juries to apply the test.
First, it notes that the risk-utility test "is more difficult to apply
43. See Paul D. Rheingold & Susan B. Feinglass,Risk- UtilityAnalysis in the Failure
to Warn Context, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353 (1997).
44. See, e.g., Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A-2d 11, 15 (Md. 1975). The court observed
that in cases such as this the cost of giving an adequate warning is usually so
minimal, amounting only to the expense of adding some more printing to a label,
that this balancing process will almost always weigh in favor of an obligation to
warn of latent dangers, if the manufacturer is otherwise required to do so.
Id.; see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 296-97 (claiming that judges and
juries tend "to assume erroneously that warnings are virtually costless").
45. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text; see also M. Stuart Madden, The
Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. Rv. 221,
299-301 (1987) (discussing cases in which a duty arises only where an "appreciable
number" of users will be affected). But see id. at 301-03 (discussing cases in which a
duty was found to exist even to an "idiosyncratic" consumer).
46. See Madden, supra note 45, at 253-57 (arguing that obvious risks create no duty
to warn).
47. See id. at 312 (noting that the physical characteristics of warnings are criteria
of adequacy).
48. See supra Part II.A.
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in the warnings context" than in the context of product design.49
Given the serious problems that allegedly arise when courts and
juries evaluate product designs with the risk-utility test, ° the
assertion that warnings present even more difficult problems is
troubling. The Draft also claims that it is "difficult to determine
the appropriate degree of intensity with which warnings should
be transmitted." l If this is true, the lack of well-defined guide-
lines may create implementation problems that render the
risk-utility test undesirable in practice.
C. Implementing the Risk-Utility Test for Inadequate
Warnings in the Restatement (Third) Draft:
Is There a Particular Cause for Concern?
To ascertain whether the risk-utility test would be particularly
difficult for courts and juries to apply, we need to evaluate how
the test would work for the different types of warning
claims-those involving the disclosure of unavoidable risks, the
disclosure of instructions regarding product use, and the design
or format of the warning. Each type of claim involves a number
of distinct issues. As a result, each issue must be defined before
we can determine whether courts and juries can competently
evaluate the claim as a whole. Breaking a warning claim down
into its component parts indicates that resolution of the claim
involves issues which juries are well equipped to resolve.
1. Disclosure of Unavoidable Risks-For cases in which the
plaintiff claims that the warning is inadequate because it does
not disclose an unavoidable risk (such as the risk of suffering
an allergic reaction), the initial question is whether the average
consumer would benefit from the disclosure; that is, the disclo-
sure must pertain to a risk that is significant and not commonly
understood. If the average consumer would not derive a signifi-
cant benefit from the disclosure, the utility of the disclosure is
necessarily less than its information cost. 2 Thus, unless the
49. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. h.
50. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1558 (1973)
(discussing the myriad problems involved in the process).
51. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 10, at § 2 cmt. h.
52. See supra note 32.
WINTER AND SPRING 19971
330 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:2&3
plaintiff can show that the requested disclosure would be
material to the average consumer, there is no need to proceed
further.
Assume the jury concludes that the requested disclosure would
significantly influence the average consumer's decision to buy
a product. Although the jury must then weigh the benefit of
improved decisionmaking against the disclosure's cost, the jury
may not have to evaluate the disclosure with a full-blown
risk-utility analysis. If sellers are held accountable for the
warnings they provide, the plaintiff can rely upon a presumption
that the disclosures already contained in the warning satisfy the
risk-utility test. On the basis of this presumption, the jury may
be able to evaluate the disclosure requested by the plaintiff
without having to engage in a cost-benefit analysis. Simply put,
as an alternative to the extant warning, the plaintiff proposes
a warning in which a more significant risk replaces a less
significant risk. Given a presumption that the less significant
risk already disclosed in the warning satisfies the risk-utility
test, it follows that disclosure of a more significant risk would
also satisfy the risk-utility test. The jury therefore can find for
the plaintiff if it concludes that the disclosure requested by the
plaintiff involves a risk that is more significant to the average
consumer than any other risk already disclosed in the warning.53
If the jury concludes that the disclosure requested by the
plaintiff does not involve a risk of greater significance than any
other risk already described in the warning, it needs to decide
whether the additional disclosure would undermine the effec-
tiveness of the other, more important disclosures already
contained in the warning. Space constraints, for example, may
create an undesirable crowding-out effect. If the additional
disclosure would significantly undermine the effectiveness of
more important disclosures, it probably creates a cost that
exceeds any benefit it might offer to consumers. Thus, if the jury
concludes that the disclosure requested by the plaintiff would
significantly diminish the effectiveness of other disclosures
already in the warning, it can conclude that the plaintiff has not
satisfied the risk-utility test.
53. In addition, a presumption that a warning contains only material disclosures
of risk-related information would create beneficial incentives. If plaintiffs can show that
the warning should contain a nondisclosed risk because it is more significant than a risk
already contained in the warning, product sellers have an incentive not to disclose
insignificant risks in a product warning, which is desirable because such disclosures are
detrimental to consumers as a group.
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Suppose the plaintiff clears this hurdle. What happens next?
The situation is one in which the additional disclosure requested
by the plaintiff is not more significant than any disclosure
already contained in the warning. Consequently, the additional
disclosure cannot receive greater emphasis than the previously
disclosed risks (otherwise it would significantly diminish the
effectiveness of these other disclosures, which is not permissible
for reasons just given). A disclosure that receives the least
emphasis is one that will be read last by the consumer. Thus,
if the disclosure requested by the plaintiff is to satisfy the
risk-utility test, the jury must decide that the average consumer
would find it worthwhile to read the entire warning to get the
information in the disclosure requested by the plaintiff.
The requirements of the risk-utility test therefore yield the
following set of issues (framed as jury questions) that the jury
must decide in order to resolve the question of whether the
warning provided by the seller is inadequate because it does not
contain the disclosure requested by the plaintiff:
1. The plaintiff claims that the defendant should warn con-
sumers about the risk of [Li. Would the average consumer
find this risk to be significant or important in deciding whether
to buy the product? If the answer to this question is yes, you
must answer the next question. If the answer is no, you must
find for the defendant.
2. Is the risk of [__ so commonly understood or otherwise
obvious to consumers that a warning about the risk is not likely
to change significantly the average consumer's understanding
of the risk? If the answer to this question is yes, you must find
for the defendant. If the answer is no, you must answer the next
question.
3. The warning provided by the defendant already contains
disclosures about other risks. Would the average consumer
attach greater significance to the risk disclosure requested by
the plaintiff than to any other risk disclosure already contained
in the warning? If the answer to this question is yes, you must
find for the plaintiff. If the answer is no, you must answer the
next question.
4. If the risk disclosure requested by the plaintiff were put
onto the warning, would it significantly diminish the effec-
tiveness of other disclosures already contained in the warning?
If the answer to this question is yes, you must find for the
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defendant. If the answer is no, you must answer the next
question.
5. Do you think the average consumer would find it worth-
while to read the entire warning already provided by the defen-
dant to get the information requested by the plaintiff? If the
answer to this question is yes, you must find for the plaintiff.
Otherwise, you must find for the defendant.
2. Disclosure of Instructions Regarding Product Use-In
most respects, evaluating a claim that a warning is inadequate
because it does not disclose information about precautions
parallels the evaluation of a claim that a warning is inadequate
because it does not disclose information about unavoidable risks.
The primary difference is that the benefit of disclosure is defined
differently. There are many ways to reduce risk (not using the
product, for example), but consumers would choose to take a
precaution only if it costs less than the benefit of risk reduction.
Hence disclosures regarding precautions can be material-that
is, beneficial--only if the precaution is cost-effective.
Once we take this difference into account, the prior analysis
of unavoidable risks can be used to derive a set of questions that
the jury must answer to decide whether the warning is inade-
quate because it does not contain the instruction regarding
product use requested by the plaintiff:
1. The plaintiff claims that the defendant should warn
consumers about the need to [ j when using the product.
Would the average consumer find it worthwhile to take this
precaution? If the answer to this question is yes, you must
answer the next question. If the answer is no, you must find for
the defendant.
2. Is the need to take the precaution so commonly under-
stood or otherwise obvious to consumers that describing the
precaution in the product warning is not likely to change
significantly the average consumer's understanding of the need
to take the precaution? If the answer to this question is yes, you
must find for the defendant. If the answer is no, you must
answer the next question.
3. The warning provided by the defendant already con-
tains disclosures about other risks. Would the average con-
sumer attach greater significance to the instruction requested
by the plaintiff than to any other risk disclosure already con-
tained in the warning? If the answer to this question is yes,
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you must find for the plaintiff. If the answer is no, you must
answer the next question.
4. If the instruction requested by the plaintiff were put onto
the warning, would it significantly diminish the effectiveness of
other disclosures already contained in the warning? If the
answer to this question is yes, you must find for the defendant.
If the answer is no, you must answer the next question.
5. Do you think the average consumer would find it worth-
while to read the entire warning already provided by the defen-
dant in order to get the information requested by the plaintiff?
If the answer to this question is yes, you must find for the
plaintiff. Otherwise, you must find for the defendant.
3. The Method of Disclosure-A plaintiff can claim that the
warning is inadequate because it does not emphasize adequately
an unavoidable risk or instruction regarding product use. There
are two types of claims that fall into this category.
First, the plaintiff may allege that the warning does not
prioritize risks properly as it gives less significant risks greater
emphasis than more significant risks. To establish that the
warning is inadequate in this respect, the plaintiff must show
that the risk which caused her injury is more significant than
a different risk that is given greater emphasis in the warning.
In other words, the plaintiff proposes a warning identical to the
current warning with the exception that the two risk disclosures
change places. If the change results in the greater emphasis of
a more significant risk and a reduced emphasis of a less signifi-
cant risk, the new format necessarily passes the risk-utility
test.
54
A potential problem with this claim is that there may be such
a small difference between the significance of the risks in
question that a minor restructuring of the warning is likely to
offer little or no benefit.55 Consequently, it is important to
ensure that the jury considers whether the proposed alteration
is likely to be beneficial.
These considerations suggest that in applying the risk-utility
test to this type of claim, the jury needs to answer the following
questions:
54. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
55. Cf Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 308 n. 180 (asserting that where "the
disparity between one risk and another is not gross, it is folly to pretend that risks can
be ordered by performing a risk-utility analysis for each individual harm to be avoided").
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1. The warning provided by the defendant already contains
a disclosure about the risk that caused the plaintiffs injury. The
warning also contains a disclosure pertaining to the risk of
fL 1. Would the average consumer attach greater significance
to the disclosure of the risk that caused the plaintiffs injury
than to the disclosure pertaining to the risk of [L___I? If the
answer to this question is yes, you must answer the following
question. If the answer is no, you must find for the defendant.
2. Consider a warning identical to the warning supplied by
the defendant except for one change in the format of the warn-
ing: the risk that caused the plaintiffs injury is described in the
same place and manner as the disclosure pertaining to the risk
of [L 1. The disclosure pertaining to the risk of [ I is then
described in the same place and manner as the disclosure
pertaining to the risk that caused the plaintiffs injury. Now, if
you consider this warning in its entirety, would this change in
the format of the warning give the average consumer a signifi-
cantly better understanding of the risks posed by the product
and the need to take precautions while using it? If the answer
to this question is yes, you must find for the plaintiff. If the
answer is no, you must find for the defendant.
The second type of claim in which the plaintiff challenges the
method of disclosure is based on the allegation that the warning
does not adequately describe the risk which caused the plain-
tiffs injury. As the plaintiff is not challenging the way in which
the warning prioritizes risks, the modification proposed by the
plaintiff cannot give the risk in question greater emphasis than
more significant risks described in the warning. In addition,
because the plaintiff may be proposing an insignificant modifi-
cation of the warning, it is important for the jury to consider
whether the change offers significant benefits. These consider-
ations suggest that the requirements of the risk-utility test
would be satisfied for these cases if the jury were to answer the
following questions:
1. The plaintiff proposes that the warning be modified so
that it describes the risk that caused her injury in the following
way: [__]. Would the modification proposed by the plaintiff give
the risk that caused her injury greater emphasis than other
disclosures regarding more significant risks? If the answer to
this question is yes, you must find for the defendant. If the
answer is no, you must answer the following question.
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2. Consider a warning that is identical to the warning
supplied by the defendant except for the modification proposed
by the plaintiff. Now, if you consider this warning in its entirety,
would this change in the formatting of the warning give the
average consumer a significantly better understanding of the
risks posed by the product and the need to take precautions
while using it? If the answer to this question is yes, you must
find for the plaintiff. If the answer is no, you must find for the
defendant.
4. The Ability of Courts and Juries to Apply the Risk- Utility
Test-Henderson and Twerski, among others, have argued that
the risk-utility test as applied in the warnings context often
results in erroneous findings of liability.56 No doubt, some courts
and juries have not properly applied the risk-utility test to
warning claims. These cases do not imply, however, that juries
cannot properly apply the risk-utility test. Moreover, even if
juries are likely to make mistakes in applying the risk-utility
test, it does not follow that the causation element should be
altered to fix that problem, as Henderson and Twerski propose.
Some courts have underestimated or ignored the cost (or risk)
created by warnings,57 so juries that applied the risk-utility test
in these jurisdictions were in fact applying a one-sided test that
favored liability. Any inappropriate outcomes in these cases
therefore do not support the claim that properly instructed
juries cannot competently apply the risk-utility test.
Of course, even if courts tell juries to consider the information
cost created by warnings, it is plausible that juries will still tend
to make mistakes. Each type of warning claim involves a
number of distinct issues. Consequently, juries might be prone
to err if they attempt to address the various issues by answering
the single question of whether the warning passes the risk-
utility test. But if this is true, the requirements of the risk-
utility test should be reduced to jury instructions that separately
address the different issues involved in a warning claim. If the
risk-utility test is implemented in this way, it should not be
particularly difficult for juries to evaluate the adequacy of a
warning because the jury instructions involve issues that juries
can competently resolve.
56. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
57. Cf supra note 44.
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Most of the issues contained in the jury instructions described
earlier involve consideration of the average consumer. All jurors
typically will have extensive personal experience as consumers,
so collectively they should be competent to pass judgment on
consumer issues." For example, the jury should have a good feel
for whether the risk is commonly known in the community or
otherwise sufficiently obvious to the average consumer. The jury
should also be able to assess whether the disclosure is likely to
enhance the average consumer's understanding of product risk,
and whether alterations in the warning enhance or undermine
the effectiveness of its message.5 9
Indeed, if we consider the issues that commonly arise in other
cases, it is hard to understand why we should be particularly
concerned about the jury's ability to evaluate product warnings.
Other kinds of cases involving the disclosure of information
require the jury to resolve issues similar to those involved in
warning cases.60 Ordinary negligence actions also involve issues
that are at least as difficult as those involved in warning cases.6
58. Cf Mark Geistfeld, PlacingA Price on Pain and Suffering:A Method for Helping
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 839-40
(1995) (arguing that juries give more reliable responses to consumer issues than do
surveys based on the responses of a large number of lay individuals).
59. Howard Latin has argued that the lack of scientific data and the absence of
industry standards prevents courts and juries from competently evaluating whether a
warning contains too much information, leading to information "overload" that renders
consumers unable to remember everything disclosed in the warning. See Latin, supra
note 6, at 1284. The jury instructions I have proposed do not focus on this aspect of the
cost created by warnings, however. Instead, the instructions rely on reading costs and
the way in which the plaintiffs proposed modification of the warning affects the average
consumer's understanding of other disclosures in the warning by altering their emphasis.
60. Questions of disclosure arise in cases involving fraud, informed consent to
medical procedures, and communications governed by the federal securities laws. In
fraud cases, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's misrepresentation pertained
to a material fact. A fact is material "when a reasonable man would attach importance
to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction
in question." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1977). Similarly, the doctrine
of informed consent imposes a duty on physicians to disclose to the patient the material
risks of a proposed treatment. A risk is material "when a reasonable person, in what
the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to
attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the
proposed therapy." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting
John R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L.
REv. 628, 640). Finally, in cases brought under the federal securities law, plaintiffs must
show that the nondisclosure is material. As applied to nondisclosures in proxy state-
ments, for example, "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." TSC
Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
61. Consider the factors a jury must consider in deciding whether the defendant
was negligent:
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Given the difficult technical issues that arise in design-defect
litigation (Should the gas tank be located on the side or rear of
a pickup truck?), it is hard to understand why the Restatement
(Third) Draft asserts that the risk-utility test "is more difficult
to apply in the warnings context" than in the context of product
design.62
These observations do not show that the jury can competently
apply the risk-utility test when evaluating product warnings,
but they do suggest that any problem in this regard is not
limited to warning cases. If such a problem exists-and the
analysis here does not support that conclusion-then it stems
from the difficult issues raised by the underlying liability
standard. Consequently, the appropriate solution is to replace
the unworkable liability standard with simple rules that are
easy to apply.63 Modifying the causation element, as Henderson
and Twerski propose,64 is not an acceptable solution because it
bears no logical relationship to the underlying problem. There
is no reason to expect that a more stringent causation standard
tends to eliminate liability only in those cases where it is most
appropriate to do so. Indeed, an analysis of the causation
element shows why it would be unsatisfactory to modify the
causation element in order to address problems with the under-
lying liability standard.
III. THE ROLE OF CAUSATION
As is true in other tort actions, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant's tortious conduct-the sale of a product with an
inadequate warning-caused the injury. Three different ap-
proaches are available to implement this requirement. One
approach relies upon an objective standard and requires the
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interest which is to be
advanced or protected by the conduct;
(b) the extent of the chance that this interest will be advanced or protected by
the particular course of conduct;
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be adequately advanced or
protected by another and less dangerous course of conduct.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292 (1965).
62. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. h.
63. For an argument along these lines, see Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of
Risk/ Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469 (1987).
64. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff to show that a reasonable person, upon reading the
adequate warning, would have acted to avoid the injury suffered
by the plaintiff. This type of approach is commonly used in
medical malpractice actions involving informed consent.65 A
second approach relies upon a subjective standard: The inquiry
is whether the plaintiff, upon reading the adequate warning,
would have acted in a manner that would have avoided the
injury. This type of approach is commonly used in tort actions
involving fraud.66 A third approach presumes causation once the
plaintiff has shown that the warning was defective because it
did not disclose adequately the risk that caused the injury.
Although a number of courts have adopted this approach for
failure-to-warn claims, outside of the warnings context tort law
eliminates the plaintiffs burden of proving causation only in a
few special situations.67
The Restatement (Third) Draft rejects the third approach, 8
reasoning that "[tihere are no significant differences in the
general concept of causation as applied in products liability
cases and causation in cases based on negligence."69 Whatever
the merits of this position, it does not reflect the approach to
causation that most courts have adopted.7 ° It does not follow,
however, that the Restatement (Third) Draft relies upon the
wrong approach to causation, as the appropriate approach is the
one that best furthers the purpose of this form of tort liability.
There are rationales for tort liability that justify elimination of
the presumption of causation, but if the purpose of the warning
doctrine is to give sellers an incentive to disclose adequate
product warnings, the Draft adopts the wrong approach. Instead,
the approach most likely to lead to the disclosure of the optimal
amount of risk-related information is to presume causation once
the plaintiff has shown the warning did not disclose adequately
the risk that caused her injury.
65. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 191 (5th
ed. 1984) (noting that "most courts have adopted an objective standard of causation:
whether a reasonable patient in the plaintiff's position would have withheld consent to
the treatment or procedure had the material risks been disclosed").
66. ."[The person deceived is not held to the standard of precaution, or of minimum
knowledge, or of intelligent judgment, of the hypothetical reasonable man .... " Id.
§ 108, at 751.
67. See id. § 41, at 270-71 (describing situation in which liability is found against
multiple defendants when it is clear that one of them is guilty, even if it is not clear
which one).
68. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
69. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 10, § 10 cmt. a.
70. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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A. The Objective Standard
The way in which the objective standard of causation affects
the plaintiffs ability to recover depends upon the type of warn-
ing claim. First, consider cases involving the disclosure of
unavoidable risks such as allergic reactions. As all users of the
product necessarily are exposed to these risks, the plaintiff could
avoid being injured by such a risk only if she would not have
purchased the product upon being warned of the risk. Thus, to
satisfy the objective standard of causation, the plaintiff must
show that the average consumer, upon reading the warning
requested by the plaintiff, would have decided not to purchase
the product. The plaintiff will be unable to satisfy this burden
in all but the most extreme cases.
Suppose the disclosure requested by the plaintiff would
increase the average consumer's estimate of the cost of the
product by ten percent. A ten percent increase in the cost of a
product after the disclosure is analytically equivalent to a ten
percent increase in the price of an otherwise identical product
that does not pose the risk in question.71 Clearly, this disclosure
is material to the average consumer, yet it is doubtful the
plaintiff could show that the average consumer would have
decided not to purchase the product following the disclosure.
How many products are there for which a ten percent increase
in price would cause the average consumer to forego purchasing
the product? Indeed, if the typical consumer would choose not
to purchase the product after disclosure, then the disclosure
likely would drive the product off the market. Although this may
be true for some extreme cases (for example, disclosures pertain-
ing to the health risks of asbestos), in general the disclosure of
unavoidable risks is unlikely to change the average consumer's
decision of whether to purchase the product.
For most unavoidable risks, then, the plaintiff will not be able
to satisfy the objective standard of causation by showing that
the disclosure would have resulted in the average consumer
avoiding the injury by choosing not to purchase the product.
This outcome is problematic. After all, if the price of the product
increases by ten percent, total demand for the product ordinarily
71. In both cases, the net benefit of the product remains the same to the consumer,
so the consumer would view each product as being equivalent.
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will decline. Within the market as a whole, some consumers will
choose not to purchase the product following the disclosure. The
question is, which ones?
Because this question cannot be resolved satisfactorily by
asking how the average consumer would respond to the dis-
closure, it might seem that a better approach is to ask what a
reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would have done
following disclosure. This approach would enable the plaintiff
to recover if she can prove that she has the characteristics of a
marginal consumer-that is, a consumer whose decision about
whether to purchase the product is sensitive to a price increase
of ten percent. The problem with this approach is that the
plaintiff cannot show that she has the characteristics of the
marginal consumer. Consumers decide what products to buy
based upon the intensity of their preferences for the product,
subject to the constraint imposed by the product price and the
consumer's income or wealth.72 Price, as we have found, can
resolve the causation issue only in the most extreme cases.
Income or wealth are not relevant as they only influence de-
mand; they do not determine whether an individual is a mar-
ginal consumer. 3 The determinant of whether someone is a
marginal consumer depends, rather, upon the intensity of that
person's preferences for the product. The less intense someone's
preferences-that is, the less utility or benefit a person derives
from the product-the more likely the person will decide not to
buy the product after a price increase. The plaintiff ordinarily
will be unable to show that she has the preferences of the
marginal consumer, however, because the intensity of consumer
preferences usually is not observable and thus not provable in
court.
Economic theory has little to say about how we can determine
the intensity of an individual's preferences: "Unless we provide
our consumer with a questionnaire or otherwise directly inquire
as to her preferences, the only signs we will see of her prefer-
ences are the choices she makes."74 The choices that the plaintiff
72. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 38 (1990) (stating
that the consumer's objective is choosing "the consumption bundle x that is best
according to preferences, subject to the constraint that total cost of x is no greater than
the consumer's income").
73. Some rich people, for example, may decide not to purchase the product following
a 10% price increase because they do not get enough benefit out of the product.
Similarly, poor people who get a great deal of use from the product would still buy it
even if its price increased by 10%.
74. KREPS, supra note 72, at 26.
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has made previously with respect to the product will typically
be of little help in resolving a counterfactual inquiry into how
she would have acted if the product price had been increased by
ten percent. The only proof that remains, then, is the plaintiffs
testimony concerning her preferences for the product. There is
nothing objective about an approach to causation that depends
entirely on the plaintiffs testimony concerning her unobservable
preferences.
As there is no objectively verifiable evidence whether the
plaintiff is a marginal consumer, the only way the plaintiff can
satisfy the objective standard of causation is to show that the
average consumer would not have purchased the product upon
being warned of the risk that caused the plaintiffs injury.
Consequently, the plaintiff will not be able to recover except for
the most egregious cases involving risk disclosures that would
drive the product off the market. Plaintiffs will also confront this
problem when they claim the warning is inadequate because it
does not emphasize properly unavoidable risks that were
already disclosed in the warning. Thus, if courts were to adopt
the objective standard of causation, it is likely that plaintiffs
would not prevail for most claims involving the disclosure of
unavoidable product risks.
By contrast, the objective standard of causation ordinarily will
present no obstacle to recovery when the plaintiff claims the
warning does not adequately disclose instructions regarding
product use. To show that the warning should contain a disclo-
sure regarding product use, the plaintiff must show that the
average consumer would find it worthwhile to take the precau-
tion but is not sufficiently aware of that need.75 Hence, by
establishing that the disclosure is material, the plaintiff also
demonstrates that the average consumer would have taken the
precaution-and avoided the injury-had the warning ade-
quately disclosed instructions regarding the precaution in
question.
B. The Subjective Standard
For warning claims involving unavoidable risks, the same
problem that plagues the objective standard also undermines
75. See supra Part II.C.3.
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the subjective standard for establishing causation. To deter-
mine whether a particular individual would decide not to
purchase the product after a price increase requires some proof
that the individual has the characteristics of a marginal con-
sumer. For most disclosures of unavoidable risks, no evidence
would establish this fact other than the plaintiffs testimony
that she would not have purchased the product had she known
of the risk in question.
Making the liability determination turn on the plaintiffs
testimony is problematic for a number of reasons. As the plain-
tiff is testifying about her own, unobservable preferences for the
product in question, there is no way to tell whether the plaintiff
is lying. Given the obviously self-serving nature of the plaintiffs
testimony, juries typically will have no basis for deciding wheth-
er the plaintiff is telling the truth. The jury accordingly has
virtually unfettered discretion to decide whether the plaintiff
should recover. The possibility that jurors would make their
decision by relying upon extralegal factors such as gender, race,
socioeconomic status, or physical appearance is a significant
concern. Studies have shown that such factors become more
influential in jury decisionmaking when the legal standards are
most ambiguous.7 6 And even if jurors are not influenced by
extralegal factors, their unfettered discretion makes it virtually
impossible to rationalize any decision they do make.
To be sure, the subjective standard for determining causation
is used in tort actions involving fraud, but it is much easier for
juries to determine whether an individual has been duped by a
fraudulent scheme than it is to determine whether someone has
the preferences of a marginal consumer. In fraud cases, "people
who are exceptionally gullible, superstitious, ignorant, stupid,
dim-witted, or illiterate, have been allowed to recover when the
defendant knew it, and deliberately took advantage of it."7"
These characteristics of the plaintiff are subject to proof, unlike
the preferences of a marginal consumer. Moreover, the subjec-
tive standard of causation in fraud cases can be limited by facts
that are also subject to proof. "The plaintiffs conduct must not
be so utterly unreasonable, in the light of information apparent
76. See Martin F. Kaplan & Charles E. Miller, Group Decision Making and Nor-
mative Versus Informational Influence: Effects of Type of Issue and Assigned Decision
Rule, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 306, 310 (1987) (describing study showing
that mock juror discussions regarding punitive damages are more likely to involve
normative, value-laden judgments than references to the evidence presented at trial).
77. KEETON ET AL., supra note 65, § 108, at 751.
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to him, that the law may properly say that his loss is his own
responsibility." 8 The information available to the plaintiff in a
fraud case can be established by credible evidence. For example,
often there is evidence, such as facts that were observed by the
plaintiff, showing that the plaintiff could not have been fooled
by the misrepresentation unless he closed his eyes to the truth.
Hence, even if the plaintiff testifies otherwise, the court or jury
is not compelled to believe him. In addition, if the plaintiff is of
normal intelligence, experience, and education, then his testimo-
ny about relying upon the misrepresentation can be disregarded
if the jury concludes that a person with similar characteristics
would recognize the falsity of the representation. By contrast,
the concept of the marginal consumer does not depend upon
observable traits such as intelligence, experience, or education
that can be compared to the plaintiffs traits, so the jury has no
basis to reject the plaintiffs testimony on the ground that he
has the characteristics of a consumer who would have acted
differently.
Thus, as compared to the objective standard for establishing
causation in warning cases, the subjective standard is unlikely
to ease the plaintiffs burden of proof if courts require that
plaintiffs satisfy this standard with credible evidence. If, howev-
er, courts do not require such evidence-that is, if the plaintiff
can prove causation merely by testifying that he would not have
purchased the product had he known about the risk-then in
effect the courts are doing nothing other than presuming causa-
tion. Hence, for warning claims involving unavoidable risks, the
only true choice for the causation standard is between the
objective standard and the standard that presumes causation.
For warning claims that involve instructions regarding
product use, the standard of causation, once again, has a
different effect. Although the average consumer would use the
product as instructed, the plaintiff might not. The defendant can
offer evidence regarding the plaintiffs tendency to follow warn-
ings, and this evidence might enable the jury to evaluate the
veracity of the plaintiffs testimony that he would have followed
the instructions had they been given to him. Thus, as compared
to the objective standard, the subjective standard makes it
harder for the plaintiff to recover in these cases.
78. Id. at 750. The ensuing discussion about the limits to the subjective standard
in fraud cases is drawn from this source.
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C. The Presumption of Causation
For warning cases involving unavoidable risks, the choice
among causation standards reduces to a choice between the
objective standard and a presumption of causation. The objective
standard would bar the plaintiff from recovery except for the
most egregious cases involving risk disclosures that would drive
the product off the market. A rebuttable presumption of causa-
tion, by contrast, would enable the plaintiff to recover merely
by showing that the warning inadequately disclosed the risk
that caused her injury. The choice between these two approaches
to causation depends, then, upon the desirability of holding
product sellers liable for risk disclosures that are material but
not significant enough to drive the product off the market.
If products liability law must be justified in terms of corrective
justice, the presumption of causation is difficult to defend.
Although there are different formulations of the theory, correc-
tive justice involves the "undoing, by means of an award of
damages, the wrong suffered by the plaintiff at the hands of the
defendant."79 Hence, unless the plaintiff can establish causa-
tion-the element that links her injury to the defendant's
wrongful conduct-she has not established a right grounded in
corrective justice to receive compensation from the defendant."0
It might seem that the Restatement (Third) Draft endorses a
corrective-justice conception of products liability. The Draft
refers to the "fairness" of its proposed liability rules,8 ' and
corrective justice is the "simplest and most venerable justifi-
cation for tort liability." 2 Yet a corrective-justice rationale for
products liability is difficult to understand. Indeed, many tort
scholars, including corrective-justice theorists, do not believe
that this rationale is appropriate for cases in which the plaintiff
and defendant are in a contractual relationship. 3 The reason is
79. IzHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 12 (1993).
80. See, e.g., Ernest Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 485,511
(1989) ("ITihe justifications applicable to the plaintiffs claim must treat the causation
as essential to their normative force.").
81. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a (describing why it is fair to
require "individual users and consumers to bear appropriate responsibility for proper
product use").
82. 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 24.
83. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 407-29 (1992) (arguing that
while corrective justice best explains tort law, products liability rules, like contract law,
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that the injury is caused by a good or service the injurer has
sold to the victim. The cost of tort liability faced by the seller
therefore is passed onto buyers in the form of higher prices.
Because potential victims pay for and receive the benefits of tort
liability, their preference for tort rules that maximize the net
benefit of tort liability should govern. Consequently, many
scholars agree that tort rules ought to promote efficiency for
cases in which the injurer and victim are in a contractual
relationship.84
The Restatement (Third) Draft does recognize the need to
justify its liability rules with efficiency considerations.85 Indeed,
the Draft indicates that efficiency considerations should domi-
nate, at least in the context of design and warning defects, by
stating that the emphasis for imposing liability on products
which are defectively designed or sold without adequate warn-
ings "is on creating incentives for manufacturers to achieve
optimal levels of safety in designing and marketing products....
Society benefits most when the right, or optimal, amount of
product safety is achieved."86 This emphasis on efficiency is
reflected in the liability standards proposed by the Draft, as
they have the potential to remedy the market failure in the
provision of product safety and risk-related information. 7
There are good reasons, then, for concluding that the choice
of causation standard should depend upon efficiency consider-
ations. If tort liability is to give product sellers an incentive to
disclose risk-related information to consumers, the cause of
action must be formulated so that the seller would find it more
cost-effective to disclose rather than to incur liability costs
stemming from the nondisclosure. The presumption of causation
is needed to accomplish this result.
should promote efficiency); George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARv. L. REv. 537, 544 & n.24 (1972) (noting that strict liability in the area of defective
products has the added attribute of insurance, thereby complicating the fairness issue).
But see ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw 20 (1995) (claiming that corrective
justice applies to the entire domain of private law-tort, contract, and unjust enrich-
ment).
84. See, e.g., 1 AMERICAN LAw INST., supra note 11, at 30-32 (1991) (asserting that
"the generally prevailing scholarly theory about the appropriate role of tort law" is based
on the efficient control of accident costs); George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and
the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184, 185 (Robert E. Litan &
Clifford Winston eds., 1988) ("Virtually all courts and commentators have embraced the
goals of accident reduction and insurance that correspond to the principal economic
effects of the law.").
85. See, e.g., Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a.
86. Id.
87. See supra Parts I.B, II.B.
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Suppose consumers are unaware of a two in 100,000 risk of
suffering $50,000 in damages. As the expected value of this
injury is one dollar, if the seller discloses and consumers pay for
the injury, the expected cost of the product to consumers in-
creases by one dollar. Suppose that this one dollar increase in
cost for consumers is equivalent to a ten percent increase in the
price of an otherwise identical product that does not pose the
risk in question. Clearly, the risk is material and should be
disclosed in the warning. But a ten percent increase in price is
unlikely to cause the average consumer to forego purchasing the
product, so the objective standard of causation accordingly would
bar the plaintiff from recovery. As a result, the seller would not
incur any liability costs and has no incentive to disclose. The
objective standard therefore leads to an inefficient outcome.
Indeed, even if the seller were liable for one-half of the injuries,
it still would not have an incentive to disclose. By disclosing, the
seller raises the average consumer's estimate of the cost of the
product by one dollar. By not disclosing and paying for one-half
of the injuries, the seller incurs an expected liability cost per
product of fifty cents (as the expected liability pertains to a one
in 100,000 risk of paying $50,000 in damages). The seller is
better off by not disclosing, since doing so increases product
price by fifty cents as opposed to an equivalent increase of one
dollar resulting from the disclosure. Thus, in order for the seller
to have an incentive to disclose, it must be liable for all injuries
caused by the nondisclosed risk. In that case, the seller's expect-
ed liability costs stemming from nondisclosure at minimum
equal one dollar per product (the two in 100,000 risk of paying
$50,000 in damages), and is likely to exceed one dollar due to
litigation costs. The seller therefore has an incentive to disclose,
because the cost of nondisclosure is equal to or greater than the
cost of disclosure (the price increase of one dollar that consum-
ers would infer from the disclosure). The seller must be liable
for all injuries caused by the nondisclosed risk, then, if it is to
have a sufficient incentive to disclose this unavoidable risk. The
only way to accomplish this result is to presume causation.88
88. This example is of limited generality because it assumes consumers are
completely unaware of the nondisclosed risk and always read warnings. If consumers
are somewhat aware of the risk, efficient outcomes could occur even though the seller
does not pay for every injury caused by the nondisclosed risk. For example, if the
average consumer thinks the risk is one in 100,000 when in fact it is two in 100,000,
then the seller would have to pay for only one-half of the injuries caused by the
nondisclosed risk in order to have an incentive to disclose. This same outcome occurs
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It should not be surprising that causation must be presumed
if product sellers are to have a sufficient incentive to disclose
risk-related information. Causation or reliance is presumed in
actions involving the adequacy of disclosures governed by the
federal securities law,89 and the underlying disclosure problem
is similar in the two settings. Just as potential investors need
information about a company in order to properly price its
securities, consumers need information about product risks to
make good decisions about the net benefit of a product. The
purpose of mandated disclosure, then, is the same in the two
contexts: to help investors (consumers) accurately price the
security (product).90 Moreover, like the products liability setting,
a plaintiff in securities actions would face a very difficult burden
in establishing reliance on the basis of price effects alone. This
difficulty makes it necessary to presume causation from the fact
of a material misstatement or omission.91
Because the presumption of causation can be rebutted by the
defendant, the element of causation might still limit liability in
a salutary way. Although a warning must disclose significant
risks of which the average consumer is not well informed, the
defendant can rebut the presumption of causation by showing
that the plaintiff knew about the nondisclosed risk.92 Limiting
liability in this manner may be desirable, since if the plaintiff
if all consumers are completely unaware of the risk but only one-half of them read
warnings. Nevertheless, the seller totally escapes liability under the objective standard,
so the presumption of causation remains as the only defensible approach that would give
the seller an incentive to disclose.
89. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (stating that in an
action arising under SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987), "an investor's
reliance on any public material misrepresentations" may be presumed); Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (holding that to establish fraud under
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994), "positive proof of
reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld
be material . . . ."); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970) (ex-
plaining that a stockholder can challenge successfully the results of a stockholder vote
by demonstrating a material misstatement or omission in proxy materials because causa-
tion is presumed from materiality).
90. Cf Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock
Prices, 41 DuKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (explaining that the "one principal goal of securities
laws [is] to create stock markets in which the market price of a stock corresponds to its
fundamental value").
91. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 245 (opining that requiring a plaintiff to "show a
speculative state of facts, i.e., how he would have acted if omitted material information
had been disclosed, or if the misrepresentation had not been made, would place an
unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded
on an impersonal market") (citations omitted).
92. See, e.g., Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 720-21 (N.J. 1993).
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knew of the risk, it is plausible that the average consumer is
also well informed of the risk.93 The presumption may thus
rectify any mistakes that juries make in finding that the aver-
age consumer is not well informed of the nondisclosed risk.
With respect to warning cases involving the disclosure of
instructions regarding product use, the analysis, once again, is
different. Suppose consumers are unaware of a two in 100,000
risk of suffering $50,000 in damages. As the expected value of
injury caused by this risk is one dollar, the warning should
instruct users to take a precaution that eliminates the risk if
that precaution over the product life costs users something less
than one dollar. Suppose there is such a precaution that costs
fifty cents to the average consumer. If the seller instructs users
to take this precaution, the expected cost of the product to
consumers increases by fifty cents. In this case, the seller has
an incentive to disclose even if it pays for only one-half of all
injuries caused by the nondisclosed risk. Liability costs would
increase price by at least fifty cents per product (due to the one
in 100,000 risk of paying $50,000 in damages) whereas disclo-
sure would increase the price of the product by fifty cents for the
ordinary consumer. Sellers have an incentive to disclose even
though they do not pay for all injuries caused by the non-
disclosed risk, because their decision to disclose depends upon
the cost of the precaution in question (fifty cents) rather than
upon the risk of injury (which costs one dollar on average but
is eliminated by the precaution).
As the risk of injury no longer plays a role in the seller's
decision of whether to disclose, the causation standard no longer
needs to ensure that the seller is liable for all injuries caused
by the nondisclosed risk. Consequently, each of the approaches
to causation can lead to the efficient outcome. The presumption
of causation, however, is the most defensible.
The objective standard would always lead to liability in these
cases, but that standard works poorly for warning cases involv-
ing unavoidable risks. The choice, then, is between the subjec-
tive standard and a rebuttable presumption. Each of these
approaches is likely to lead to the same outcome in most cases.
Under the subjective standard, the plaintiff almost always
testifies that she would have followed the warning, so the
93. Limiting liability in this fashion is not likely to undermine the seller's incentive
to disclose because the presumption allows for more claims than are necessary in this
respect. See supra note 88.
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defendant bears the burden of rebutting the plaintiffs testi-
mony.94 The defendant also bears the burden of rebutting the
presumption of causation. Whatever evidence shows that the
plaintiff would not have followed the warning therefore will tend
to have the same effect under the two approaches. The subjec-
tive standard is problematic, however, because it requires self-
serving and potentially speculative testimony by the plaintiff.
A rebuttable presumption therefore is more desirable as it
eliminates the need for such testimony.95
CONCLUSION
The tort system has recognized previously the difficulty of
establishing individualized causation for injuries caused by
mass-marketed products, and it responded by creating a special
rule of causation based on market share.96 A similar difficulty
arises in products liability cases involving inadequate warnings,
although the source of the identification problem is different: the
disclosure of unavoidable risks will predictably lead to a decline
in the market demand for most products, but there is no good
way to identify the consumers who would leave the market
following disclosure. Moreover, there is no good reason for.
94. See Jacobs, supra note 6, at 162-63 ("Rare indeed are cases involving the
admitted failure by plaintiff to read an allegedly inadequate warning.... Plaintiffs
invariably say that they would have read the missing or inadequate warning and that
they would have heeded it as well.") (citations omitted).
95. See Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir. 1974) (following the
presumption test and noting that the victim's mother's testimony "as to what she would
have done, had proper warnings been provided, would have been both speculative and
self-serving"); Coffman, 628 A.2d at 719 ("The use of the presumption will be conducive
to determinations of causation that are not based on extraneous, speculative consider-
ations and unreliable or self-serving evidence.").
It might seem that the presumption of causation could be rejected on the ground that
it would enable manufacturers to argue that consumers or product users always follow
warnings, thereby obviating the need for a design change. Cf Latin, supra note 6, at
1295 (concluding that consumers do not always read and follow warnings, so warnings
should not be substitutes for design changes). The presumption of causation is based
on public policy, however, rather than on the empirical premise that consumers in fact
always read and follow warnings. See Coffnan, 628 A.2d at 718 (grounding use of the
presumption in public policy). Thus, it is not inconsistent to rely upon the presumption
of causation for policy reasons while also recognizing that as an empirical matter design
changes may be better than warnings because consumers do not always read and follow
warnings.
96. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 10, § 10 cmt. c (describing the proportional
liability approach but taking no position on its merits).
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limiting liability to this group, as the nondisclosure or misstate-
ments in the warning adversely affect all consumers. Conse-
quently, any attempt to require that a plaintiff prove that an
inadequate product warning caused her injury is likely to result
in one of two outcomes, each of which is undesirable.
When confronted with cases involving the nondisclosure of
unavoidable risks, courts could apply a very lax standard that
can be satisfied by the plaintiffs self-serving testimony. A lax
subjective standard of this sort is very problematic, however.
Such a standard gives further credence to the claim that tort
liability does not depend upon well-defined standards and
accordingly requires reform by legislative action. Such an
outcome would be unfortunate, as good reasons exist for doubt-
ing that the legislative process will produce good reforms.98 A
very lax subjective standard also undermines the rule of law.
The development of strict products liability was strongly influ-
enced by Justice Traynor's observation that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur almost always led to liability no matter what proof
the manufacturer offered in its defense.99 Rather than under-
mine the rule of law, Traynor thought it more desirable to call
the rule as practiced by its proper name-strict liability. So too,
if the Restatement (Third) Draft contemplates a relaxed subjec-
tive standard for causation, then it is better to acknowledge
expressly that causation is presumed for all practical purposes.
I strongly doubt that the Restatement (Third) Draft contem-
plates that courts will be unduly lax in enforcing the require-
ment that plaintiffs prove that an inadequate warning caused
their injury. Yet a well-enforced standard of causation is also
problematic. Most likely, problems of proof effectively would
eliminate tort liability for the nondisclosure or ineffective
disclosure of many unavoidable risks. The presumption of
causation is necessary, then, if tort liability is to give product
sellers a sufficient incentive to provide the type of warnings that
maximize consumer welfare.
97. For a discussion of how the lack of well-defined standards has motivated the
legislative reform of pain and suffering damages, see Geistfeld, supra note 58, at 776-77.
98. See Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for
Products Liability Reform, 72 TEx. L. REv. 803, 836-42 (1994) (describing how
interest-group politics is likely to result in the enactment of inefficient legislative
reforms that reduce the scope of tort liability for product-caused injuries).
99. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring) ("It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and
impose what is in reality liability without negligence.").
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Tort liability will not induce sellers to provide such warnings,
however, if courts and juries do not determine properly whether
a warning is inadequate. Some courts do not recognize that the
amount of information disclosed in a warning should be limited
by the cost created by each disclosure, such as the potential for
the disclosure to detract from more significant warnings. No
doubt, judicial practice in this regard is influenced by the desire
to compensate an injured party. Courts may also think that the
additional information will help someone else. But, the desire
to help a few individuals is likely to do more harm to the entire
group, because sellers must overwarn in order to avoid tort
liability. By doing so, sellers create the impression that warn-
ings are written to protect them from liability rather than to
promote informed lecisionmaking. But once consumers feel this
way, the efficacy of warnings-their ability to reduce risk by
improving consumer decisionmaking-has been significantly
compromised.'0 0 Overwarning may ultimately harm consumers,
then, by reducing the likelihood that individuals read or follow
warnings.
The Restatement (Third) Draft makes substantial improve-
ments over current practice by emphasizing the need for courts
and juries to pay greater attention to the information cost of
disclosure. Greater emphasis on information costs is the best
way to curtail liability, as it limits the liability inquiry in the
appropriate manner. It therefore is not necessary to eliminate
the presumption of causation in order to reduce any overwarning
that presently occurs. Moreover, without the presumption of
causation, we will be confronted with the problem of warnings
that do not disclose enough information.
100. See Latin, supra note 6, at 1247-48 (discussing Temple v. Velcro USA, Inc.,
196 Cal. Rptr. 531, 532 (Ct. App. 1983), where the plaintiffs disregarded a warning
because they felt that the defendant was "just trying to protect itself').
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